Carriers--Contractual Limitation of Time in Which to File Claim for Loss Where Carrier Misdelivers Goods (Lefcort et al. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 154 Misc. 630 (Mun. Ct. 1935)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 10 
Number 1 Volume 10, December 1935, Number 
1 
Article 15 
May 2014 
Carriers--Contractual Limitation of Time in Which to File Claim for 
Loss Where Carrier Misdelivers Goods (Lefcort et al. v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., 154 Misc. 630 (Mun. Ct. 1935)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1935) "Carriers--Contractual Limitation of Time in Which to File Claim for Loss 
Where Carrier Misdelivers Goods (Lefcort et al. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 154 Misc. 630 (Mun. Ct. 
1935))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 10 : No. 1 , Article 15. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss1/15 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
employment of the brokers by the defendants. The brokers through-
out were acting merely as intermediaries for the owner to offer
proposals and transmit acceptances. There was no evidence that
defendants had agreed, expressly or impliedly, to pay commissions
or that the parties ever contracted with reference to commissions, or
even contracted at all. Whether a contract of employment of the
broker by prospective purchasers arises, in addition to that of the
broker by the owner, depends in the last analysis on the facts of
each case. 4
H. S.
CARRIERS-CONTRACTUAL LIMITATION OF TIME IN WHICH TO
FILE CLAIM FOR LOSS WHERE CARRIER MISDELIVERS GoODs.-Plainti
delivered to defendant in New York merchandise for transportation
and delivery to a consignee in another state. Defendant admittedly
misdelivered the goods. Plaintiff filed a claim with defendant fifteen
months after the loss occurred. The uniform express receipt, under
which the merchandise was shipped, stipulated that such claims must
be filed within six months and fifteen days after the date of ship-
ment.' Held, as the conceded ntisdelivery, unexplained, constituted
negligence on the part of the carrier, the stipulation is void, for the
requirement of the filing of a claim with the carrier, as a condition
precedent to an action for a loss occurring in transit through the
carrier's negligence, violates the Interstate Commerce Act. 2 Lefcort
et al. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 154 Misc. 630, 278 N. Y.
Supp. 238 (Mutt. Ct. 1935).
Even prior to the enactment of the original Interstate Commerce
Act,3 stipulations that written notice of a claim for loss of, or damage
to, goods shipped shall be given within a designated time were held
'Thus, in McKnight v. McGuire, 117 Misc. 306, 191 N. Y. Supp. 323 (lst
Dept. 1921) the following statement made by the prospective lessee was held to
bind him to a contract, breach of which resulted in a recovery by the broker;
"If you can get that house for two years for $250 a month I will take it." In
James v. Home of the Sons and Daughters of Israel, 153 N. Y. Supp. 169
(App. T. 1st Dept. 1915) where the prospect told the broker to get the property
at a certain price, after the owner had agreed to the price, and the prospect
refused to proceed, the broker was awarded damages for breach of contract.
1Clause 7 of the uniform express receipt provided in part: " * * * as
conditions precedent to recovery claims must be made in writing to the originat-
ing or delivering carriers * * * in case of failure to make delivery * * * within
six months and fifteen days after date of shipment * * *."
2 As amended (44 STAT. 1448 [1927], 49 U. S. C. A. §20 [11] [1928]) it
provides in part: "* * * if the loss * * * was due to * * * negligence while the
property was in transit * * * then no * * * filing of claim shall be required as
a condition precedent to recovery * *
'24 STAT. 386 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. §20 (11) (1928).
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to be invalid, where the loss or damage was caused by the negligence
of the carrier.4 After the passage of the Act, the requirement of
written notice, where there was negligence on the part of the carrier,
was still generally held to be inoperative, for such a requirement was
deemed to constitute an unjust exemption from liability for negli-
gence.5 But at least one decision reached the opposite conclusion,
based on the view that these provisions are not a limitation of the
common law liability of the carrier, but a reasonable protection to the
carrier, working no hardship on the shipper, and benefiting the
shipper as well as the carrier.6 Although this line of reasoning has
been occasionally adopted by the federal jurisdiction in recent cases,7
and although an interstate shipment is involved here, nevertheless,
the court, in the instant case, had ample precedent, drawn from the
United States Supreme Court, to read the Act literally,8 and hold
that the admitted misdelivery, unexplained, constituted negligence, as
a matter of law, on the part of the carrier,9 and that, consequently,
the requirement of filing was void.
B. D. B.
CONDITIONAL SALE-TEN DAYS TIME FOR REDEMPTION-AND
TEN DAYS NOTICE OF RESALE MAY RUN CONCURRENTLY.-Plain-
tiff's assignor purchased a number of taxicabs from the defendant's
assignor. After default had been made in payment, and at a time
when more than fifty per cent of the purchase price had been paid,
the defendant's assignor retook possession of the taxicabs. Fourteen
'Westcott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542, 19 Am. Rep. 300 (1872); Vroman v.
American M. U. Exp. Co., 2 Hun 512, 5 Thomp. & C. 22 (N. Y. 1874).
'Security Trust Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co. Exp., 178 N. Y. 620, 70 N. E.
1109 (1904); Richardson v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 122 App. Div. 120, 106
N. Y. Supp. 702 (4th Dept. 1907); Sheldon v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 61
Misc. 274, 113 N. Y. Supp. 676 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
1 Osterhoudt v. Southern P. R. R. Co., 47 App. Div. 146, 62 N. Y. Supp.
134 (3d Dept. 1900). The court closely followed the reasoning and ruling laid
down in the leading Federal Supreme Court case, decided before the Act was
passed, Southern Exp. Co. v. Caldwell, 88 U. S. 264, 22 L. ed. 556 (1874).
However, the Osterhoudt case appears to have been tacitly overruled, in New
York, by the decisions following it.
In particular, Georgia, F. & A. R. R. Co. v. Blish Co., 241 U_ S. 190,
36 Sup. Ct. 541 (1914) ; Chesapeake & 0. R. R. Co. v. Martin, 283 U. S. 209,
51 Sup. Ct. 453 (1931); Clegg v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R. Co., 203 Fed. 971
(C. C. A. 8th, 1913). These cases also derive their rule of expediency from
Southern Exp. Co. v. Caldwell, 88 U. S. 264, 22 L. ed. 556 (1874). Moreover,
they stress the contractual element, holding that notice of the character under
consideration is a condition precedent to recovery, in the nature of an estoppel.
'Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U. S. 85, 45 Sup. Ct. 437 (1924); Davis v.
Roper Lumber Co., 269 U. S. 158, 46 Sup. Ct. 28 (1925); Chesapeake & 0.
R. R. Co. v. Thompson Mfg. Co., 270 U. S. 416, 46 Sup. Ct. 318 (1926);
Missouri P. R. R. Co. v. Hartley Bros., 290 U. S. 576, 54 Sup. Ct. 271 (1934).
'Barr & Shoulberg v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 152 Misc. 293, 273 N. Y. Supp.
754 (1st. Dept. 1933).
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